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Abstract 
By studying the change from the alderman model to parliamentary rule in Norwegian cities 
and regions, this article analyses how and why reorganisation of political institutions influ-
ences support for the institutions reformed. We adopt a mixed methods approach consisting 
of a survey of politicians in all seven reformed Norwegian local governments, combined 
with a case study of reorganised governments with high and low levels of support for par-
liamentary rule. We find that support for the institutional model in the reformed local gov-
ernments depends on the reform’s effect on different political positions. Politicians in 
power are more positive towards parliamentary rule than members in opposition are, and 
politicians from the big parties are more positive compared to representatives from smaller 
ones. Institutional change affects the interests of these groups in different ways. In turn, the 
effects that reform has on different interests influence their support for the reformed insti-
tutions. System support is also affected by how the change process is implemented. An 
inclusive political leadership that builds oversized coalitions and allocates positions such 
as committee chairs to the opposition results in stronger support for parliamentary rule. The 
overall finding is that both “pure” institutional effects and contextual factors influence sup-
port for parliamentary rule. Support increases when there is a high level of readiness and 
capacity for change. The reform must also include relevant actors in a way meeting de-
mands for procedural fairness. The practical implication for reformers is that they must 
communicate why the organisation needs reform, arrange for sufficient implementation ca-
pacity and include relevant participants in decision-making and change processes. 
 
Introduction 
How and why does reorganisation of political institutions influence support for 
the institutions reformed? Support for established institutions influences loyalty 
towards political decisions and consequently the legitimacy of a political system. 
Understanding the mechanisms that produce system support or distrust is therefore 
a vital question for researchers and policy makers alike. 
The research question is analysed through a study of the change from the al-
derman model to parliamentary rule in Norwegian cities and regions. The litera-
ture on political institutions and organisational change tells us that both institu-
tional and contextual factors influence support for the institutions reformed. Ear-
lier research on Norwegian regions also shows that the level of support for parlia-
mentary rule is lower in the opposition parties than in the parties in power (Bukve 
and Saxi 2014). The aim of this study is to provide a systematic discussion of the 
causal mechanisms behind these findings, using a new data set and extending the 
study to both regions and cities with parliamentary rule.    
While the executive board in the alderman model is elected proportionally 
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from the parties in the council, the parliamentary model has an executive board 
supported by the council majority. Traditionally, local and regional governments 
in Norway have been organised according to the alderman model. Parliamentary 
rule, with an executive board supported by the council majority, was introduced 
in the capital city Oslo through a special act in 1986. A new local government act 
was enacted in 1993, and from then the legislation permitted all local and regional 
governments to choose between the traditional model and parliamentary rule. Four 
of the 18 counties have switched to parliamentary rule. Of Norway’s 428 local 
governments, only three of the larger cities have changed their government model. 
These seven regional and local governments form the empirical base for our study. 
It is a common assumption in political science that the manner in which po-
litical institutions are organised influences both policy content and political pro-
cesses. A number of empirical studies have thus compared the effects of parlia-
mentary versus presidential systems. Several researchers have argued that presi-
dential systems are less stable over time (Riggs 1997, Linz 1994). Studies of 
French institutions have shown how the combination of direct presidential elec-
tions and a majoritarian election system for the National Assembly has polarised 
the political system (Duhamel and Parodi 1985). Some empirical institutionalists 
have looked at the effects of “divided government” and at how coalition govern-
ments lead to decisions that differ from those made by governments formed from 
a single party (Peters 1999).  
Other comparative studies of political institutions have discussed differences 
between various democratic systems. Lijphart’s distinction between majority rule 
and consensus democracy is the point of departure for many studies of this kind 
(Lijphart 1984). We too utilise this distinction, however, our cases cannot be iden-
tified with Lijphart’s pure types. According to the Norwegian Local Government 
Act, it is mainly the organisation of the executive board that varies between the 
alderman model and parliamentary rule. An executive in a parliamentary model is 
elected by majority vote in the council, and can be dismissed by a council major-
ity. An executive of aldermen is elected proportionally according to strength in 
the council, and cannot be dismissed. Both models have a proportional election 
system, a multiparty system and a pluralistic structure of interest groups in com-
mon. While the alderman model is close to the consensus type of democracy, the 
model which was labelled parliamentary rule in the Norwegian Local Government 
Act is closer to Lijphart’s majority rule (Baldersheim 1992, Saxi 2006, 2007, 
Bukve and Saxi 2014, Saxi et. al. 2014).  
Generally, the literature raises questions about which institutional effects we 
should consider as improved performance. In some studies, the standard is simply 
the system’s ability to survive. Others have underlined societal effects, whether 
the creation of economic growth, peace (Reynal-Querol 2002), or generalized trust 
in society (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). However, we can also look at the effects 
of different political institutions on political processes, on the implementation of 
political decisions, and on specific trust in the political system. Regarding political 
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processes, we can outline different expectations of pure consensus models and 
majority rule from Lijphart’s discussion of those types (Lijphart 1984). We could 
expect that majority rule will result in clearer dividing lines between position and 
opposition, a more polarized political discussion, a higher level of conflict, and 
accountability demands more precisely directed towards the ruling majority. 
These aims also motivated the institutional reform in Norwegian cities and regions 
(Bukve and Saxi 2014, Gjerald and Bukve 2007). 
Lijphart (1968) stressed that different institutions show properties that are 
suitable for different societies. In pluralistic societies with many crosscutting con-
flict lines, majority rule may increase government capacity. In segmented socie-
ties, where some groups are at risk of being in the minority on many issues, a 
consensus democracy can contribute to a greater understanding between groups 
and higher support for the political system. With this line of argument, Lijphart 
also takes into account that the operation of political institutions may depend on 
the societal context. They are “embedded institutions.”  
Students of electoral systems have also developed an understanding of these 
systems as embedded institutions. The effects of such systems are dependent on 
the context, and on other institutions and actors who influence the outcome of 
electoral processes. They have also shown empirically which contextual factors 
are relevant. Utilizing cross-national data, Shaun Bowler and his colleagues have 
found that politicians’ evaluation of an electoral system depends on several factors 
(Bowler et al. 2006). Most notably, politicians’ self-interest affects how they eval-
uate the institutions. Those in power are more positive than the opposition, and 
they are more sceptical toward institutional change. A similar finding was made 
in an earlier study of regional parliamentarism in Norway (Bukve and Saxi, 
Gjerald  and Bukve 2007, Saxi 2007). Bowler and colleagues also show that rep-
resentatives from major parties, which have a greater chance of acquiring power, 
are more positive toward existing electoral systems compared with representatives 
from smaller parties. 
In a recent article on “Vested Interests and Political Institutions,” Terry Moe 
(2015:1) claims “…vested interests are part of the everyday language of political 
science. But they are not part of its theories, at least not in any explicit or system-
atic way”. Even if this statement takes things to extremes, it is easy to agree with 
Moe that theory building about institutions should provide a more integrated un-
derstanding of how interests may affect institutional stability and change. Vested 
interests can prevent change, but they can also be a dynamic force in institutional 
change. Even if vested interests gain advantages from the current institutional con-
figuration, they may favour change if the risk of losing power is small. Hence, to 
understand how vested interests will act in the face of a proposed change in rules, 
we need to understand both how interests are positioned in an established institu-
tional context and what risks they run from change. If the risk is low, they may 
introduce changes. The established majority is not necessarily resisting change, 
and in turn, institutional change may result in a reshuffling of positions and inter-
ests.    
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Self-interest is not the only factor affecting politicians’ evaluation of an elec-
toral system. Values and ideologies also play a role. Post-materialists more often 
support changes toward direct democracy and term limits for political positions. 
There are also some differences between politicians on the right and those on the 
left regarding reform support (Bowler et al. 2006).  
Bowler and Donovan (2013) also reveal a difference between the findings 
from cross-national comparative studies, which show the effects of electoral sys-
tems on political attitudes and behaviour, and the findings from studies that focus 
on reform processes. What happens when institutional rules are changed is not 
always in accordance with the expectations on institutional design.  
Such arguments correspond well with findings from reform studies in organ-
isational science. A series of studies on organisational reforms show that reforms 
often fail and that contextual factors influence reform implementation. Even if 
institutional setups affect processes and outcomes, there is no guarantee of success 
if one implement a reform of a certain kind in a different context. The change 
processes are complex, and the results may be different from the ambitions of the 
reformers (Brunsson and Olsen 1993, Czarniawska 2009). Research on planned 
organisational change has aimed to establish frameworks for understanding why 
organisational reforms may produce different results in different contexts. The in-
dependent variables in such frameworks may include organisational readiness for 
change, leadership support, resource mobilization, and inclusive participation 
(Packard 2013). Organisational readiness for change is in itself a complex variable 
where several factors play together (Holt et al. 2007). Do the members of the or-
ganisation consider whether change is needed? Do they believe that change is pos-
sible, and that it will become supported by the leaders? Do they believe that a 
change will have positive effects for themselves? The actual capacity for change 
is dependent on leadership support for the process and mobilization of the neces-
sary resources. . Inclusion of all relevant participants also strengthens support for 
change (Judge and Douglas 2009, Bukve and Hovlid 2014, Hovlid and Bukve 
2014). 
Whether the reforming organisation is a pioneer or latecomer has also at-
tracted interest among organisational theorists. However, there is no consensus 
about the effects of this variable (Abrahamson, 1996). Neo-institutionalists argue 
that latecomers often copy popular templates in order to gain legitimacy, while the 
conditions for changing performance is not always addressed (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). On the other hand, the literature on organisational strategies points out that 
latecomers can have the advantage of learning from the pioneers, but also that this 
opportunity is not always utilized (Figueiredo, 2003; Mathews, 2002).  
If we take the mentioned variables as a point of departure, it is reasonable to 
believe that leadership support and resources will show only a small variation be-
tween our cases, which are Norwegian cities and regions with parliamentary rule. 
Support from the political leadership was a vital factor in positive decisions on 
introduction of the reform. Resource differences will also be quite small between 
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regions and larger cities. Regarding other contextual factors, however, it is rea-
sonable to expect greater variation. Overall readiness for change may vary. Even 
if the political majority was in favour of change in all our cases, the degree of 
support from the opposition may differ. The implementation process may also be 
different. The majority may choose a more or less inclusive strategy, regarding 
both process and the sharing of political power. The willingness to adjust the 
model in accordance with experience might also be different between cases. In our 
analysis, we want to direct attention toward the significance of variation in these 
factors.      
There are several germane points when summing up the essential findings in 
research of relevance for our study. From ideal-typical reasoning and earlier re-
search on parliamentary rule, we can assume that majority rule has other effects 
on political processes and results compared to consensus democracy. Since par-
liamentary rule in Norwegian cities and regions are more similar with majority 
rule than the alderman model, we can assume changes in accordance with the for-
mer. Research on electoral systems demonstrates that the actors’ self-interest af-
fects how they evaluate political institutions. Lastly, we need to take into account 
contextual factors. In our cases, the most important ones are probably organisa-
tional readiness for change and the inclusion of the opposition in institutional de-
sign and policy formulation. Taken together, the literature shows that the outcome 
of change in political institutions may be dependent on pure institutional effects, 
the actors’ self-interest, values, and ideologies, and contextual factors in the re-
form process.     
Our research does not provide data for exploring the effects of political values 
and ideologies. In terms of institutional effects, self-interest and contextual fac-
tors, however, we can specify the following propositions regarding the effects of 
parliamentary rule in Norwegian cities and regions:     
 
• Institutional effects: Parliamentary rule results in clear divid-
ing lines between political alternatives combined with con-
centration of power in the executive, leading to a loss of in-
fluence for members of the opposition.  
• Self-interested political actors: Politicians belonging to the 
majority parties will have a more positive view of parliamen-
tary rule than opposition members have. Politicians with 
greater chance to get in power are also more positive. 
• Contextual factors: Support for parliamentary rule increases 
when organisational readiness for change is high, and when 
the opposition is included in policy formulation and adjust-
ment of the institutional setup within the frame of parliamen-
tary rule. 
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Design and method 
We tested the hypotheses by means of a mixed design, using survey data together 
with qualitative interviews in reformed cities and regions. We collected survey 
data in 2013 through a study of all three cities and four regions that adopted par-
liamentary rule.  
We first compared how members of the majority and the opposition evaluated 
parliamentary rule, using the variables power concentration, political dividing 
lines and own influence on policy. Afterwards we looked at the differences be-
tween members of large and small parties, using support for parliamentary rule as 
the dependent variable. Here we considered the Labour and Conservative parties 
to be major parties. All other parties are classed as small. Typically, there would 
be one party to the left of Labour (two in a couple of our cases), three centrist 
parties, and one to the right. This creates a political landscape where it is difficult 
to obtain a political majority without either Labour or the Conservatives. Since 
they can choose partners in different directions and are rarely dependent on the 
centrist parties, we consider that the small centrist parties do not have a signifi-
cantly higher chance of entering position than the parties to the right or left.     
We performed a multi-nominal regression analysis with support for parlia-
mentary rule as the dependent variable. The regression allowed us to analyse the 
effect of self-interest among political actors together with contextual factors. Con-
text is operationalised as case. Since we found significant differences between the 
cases, we needed to explore the cases in detail to reveal variation in the way the 
parliamentary reform was implemented. We did this via a comparative analysis of 
the two cases where support for parliamentary rule was highest, contrasted with 
the two cases where the system support was failing to the greatest extent.   
The case study focuses on three sets of contextual factors. First, we discuss 
readiness for change. We can measure this variable by looking at voting numbers 
in the decision to change to parliamentary rule decided. However, we cannot esti-
mate the readiness by voting numbers alone, since the final voting numbers may 
be a result of compromises and use of whip within the parties. Hence, we need to 
investigate the process over time in order to estimate readiness more accurately. 
Secondly, we discuss inclusiveness, operationalized as the use of oversized coali-
tions, sharing of positions and the persistence of specific cleavage lines between 
parties. The advantage of using a case study for this purpose is that it allows us to 
analyse how different combinations of the contextual factors produce a specific 
outcome (Beach, 2016). We also discuss change capacity. Since the organisations 
included are counties and bigger cities, we should not expect great variation in 
change capacity. However, a case study approach permits us to be open to any 
specific factors that may enhance or reduce change capacity.     
The questionnaire was sent to all four counties (Hedmark, Nordland, Nord-
Trøndelag, and Troms) and three cities (Bergen, Oslo, and Tromsø) with parlia-
mentary rule. The response rate varied between cities and counties. Among the 
counties, we had a 51% response rate, against only 41% among the cities. We 
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checked the dropout rate for each party. In the counties, the dropout rate deviated 
significantly from the average only for some small parties with less than 3% of 
the total number of councillors. In the cities, we found a significantly higher drop-
out rate for the Progress Party councillors, balanced by a drop-out rate below av-
erage for four other small parties, three centrist and one left-wing. We consider all 
these parties more sceptical toward parliamentary rule than the two major parties. 
Altogether, we felt justified in using the data in our analysis without weighting.         
In order to trace the reform process, we made thirty case interviews with lead-
ing politicians. Altogether we interviewed a total of 50 top politicians, the rest 
through group interviews. The interviews were transcribed for analysis, with a 
more detailed presentation given in the project report (Saxi et al. 2014). We also 
utilized interview material from earlier case studies of the parliamentary model 
(Saxi 2002, Saxi and Stigen 2006, Gjerald and Bukve 2007)). 
 
Results 
Effects of parliamentary rule on political actors and processes 
Table 1shows that position and opposition conceive political work in the parlia-
mentary system in different ways.  
 
Table 1: Effects of parliamentary rule on politicians in position and opposition 
 Position Opposition  
N 
 
Signi-
ficance 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Voting in council 
follows dividing 
lines between posi-
tion and opposition  
4.40 0.771 4.54 0.824 151   .285    
Concentration of 
power in the execu-
tive board#  
-0.054 0.738 0.667 1.529 146 .000** 
The council con-
firms executive de-
cisions 
2.69 1.433 3.74 1.464 152 .000** 
I can do useful work 
in the council 
3.89 1.203 3.22 1.382 151 .002** 
How difficult is it to 
get your political in-
itiatives through in 
the council? 
2.72 0.865 3.43 1.210 146 .000** 
Average 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. **Significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% 
level. 
# Mean difference between executive board influence and council influence 
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Regarding the factual question on voting lines, there is no difference between po-
sition and opposition. The opposition members, however, mostly view the council 
as a body that confirms executive board decisions. Power is concentrated to the 
executive board. Politicians from the opposition parties regard their political work 
as less useful compared to politicians from the parties in power, and the difference 
is highly significant. Members of parties in power also consider it easier to push 
their own political initiatives through in the council. 
 
Variation in system support 
We looked at the opinion of different political actors by asking them whether they 
supported the parliamentary model or wanted to return to an alderman model. Be-
low, we show the figures in bivariate tables for position vs. opposition and major 
vs. smaller political parties.  
 
Table 2: Preferences for governance model in the future. Position vs. opposition 
and party size  
 Parlamentary 
model 
% 
No clear 
opinion 
% 
Alderman 
model 
% 
N 
Position 78 12 10 73 
Opposition 29 15 56 75 
Pearson Chi-square 40.687a                              Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .000 
Major par-
ties 
68 17 15 88 
Small par-
ties 
32 8 60 60 
Pearson Chi-square 32.957b                              Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5.  
The minimum expected count is 9.86 
b. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5.  
The minimum expected count is 8.11 
 
There is an overwhelming preference for the parliamentary model among the pol-
iticians in power. Some 78% prefer parliamentary rule, while only 10% prefer the 
alderman model. On the other hand, more than half of the politicians from parties 
in opposition want to change back to an alderman executive. Only 29% of the 
opposition support the current model. These findings indicate that institutional re-
form affects different groups of politicians in different ways. The result is an over-
all low degree of support for the reformed model.  
While politicians in position acquire more power in a parliamentary system, 
politicians in opposition lose power. A concentration of political power was an 
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intended aim for the reform. Yet as we have shown, members of the political op-
position have also lost a sense of usefulness and meaning in their political work. 
This effect was unintended, and may be considered a democratic problem if it 
results in an enduring situation with low system support (Bukve and Saxi 2014). 
We also compared support for parliamentary rule between large and small 
parties. Labour and the Conservatives count as major parties, while we group the 
remaining parties as small parties. We find a significant difference here too. While 
two out of three politicians from the major parties prefer the parliamentary model, 
only one of three from the smaller parties supports the model. This result can also 
be explained as an effect of self-interest among politicians. Politicians in the major 
parties may have a greater chance of entering into position. If they do, they will 
gain more power in a parliamentary system. Since the major parties can choose 
between different coalition partners, the smaller parties have fewer possibilities 
for being a partner in a ruling coalition.     
There is one difficulty with discussing these effects by means of bivariate ta-
bles. Since it is more probable that members of the bigger parties are in a ruling 
coalition, there is a co-variation between the independent variables in these tables. 
Hence, we needed to perform a multivariate analysis in order to separate the causes 
of system support. Before we turned to that task, however, we looked at how sys-
tem support varies between our cases.     
 
System support in counties and cities 
Support for the parliamentary system varies a lot between the seven cities and 
counties. In Oslo, as many as 85% of the respondents are in favour of the estab-
lished model. There is also a clear majority for parliamentary rule in Bergen. In 
Tromsø opinion is divided. On the other hand, only 25% support parliamentary 
rule in the county of Hedmark. Here, 50% of the respondents want to change back 
to an alderman model. Among the four counties that have adopted parliamentary 
rule, Nordland is the only one where a clear majority of the politicians support the 
system. Politicians in Troms and Nord-Trøndelag divide in their opinions.  
 
Table 3: Preferences for governance model in the future.  
 Parlamentary 
model 
% 
No clear 
opinion 
% 
Alderman 
model 
% 
N 
Oslo 85 10 5 20 
Bergen 64 16 20 25 
Tromsø 42 16 42 19 
City total 64 14 22 64 
Nordland 67 4 29 24 
Nord-
Trøndelag 
47 6 47 17 
Troms 39 17 44 23 
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Hedmark 25 25 50 20 
County total 45 13 42 84 
 
Table 3 shows the difference in system support within the city group and the 
county group, but also between counties and cities. Internal differences between 
cities and between counties are greater than the aggregated differences between 
cities and counties. While the overall difference between cities and counties is 
19%, the difference between cities amounts to 43% (Oslo vs. Tromsø) and be-
tween counties to 42% (Nordland vs. Hedmark). This prompts us look at contex-
tual and process factors that can account for this variation in system support be-
tween individual cities and counties, but also at institutional differences between 
cities and counties. In the next section, we will use a multivariate analysis to ex-
plore these and other determinants for system support. 
 
System support: A multivariate analysis 
By means of a multivariate analysis, we look at the level of support for parliamen-
tary rule. We include the four explanatory variables discussed above: political sta-
tus (position vs. opposition), party size, institutional type (city vs. county), and 
case-specific contextual factors.   
The dependent variable is preference for the parliamentary model vs. the al-
derman model. This variable has two values. Those who do not have a clear pref-
erence are excluded from the analysis. The analysis is carried out as a multi-nom-
inal logistic regression. The explanatory power of the model is considerable, with 
the pseudo R 2 being 0.426 (Cox and Snell) and 0.578 (Nagelkerke).  
 
Table 4: Preferences for governance model in the future. Multinominal logistic 
regression 
Preference 
for an alder-
man model 
B Std. error Wald df Sig. 
Intercept 2.539 0.823 9.516 1 .002 
Oslo -4.211 1.368 9.468 1 .002** 
Bergen -2.365 0.972 5.916 1 .015* 
Tromsø -0.758 0.985 0.592 1 .442 
Nordland -2.174 0.961 5.114 1 .024* 
Troms -0.447 0.955 0.219 1 .640 
Nord-
Trøndelag -1.089 1.002 1.181 1 .277 
Hedmark 0b . . 0 . 
Major party -0.551 0.712 0.599 1 .439 
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Small party 0b . . 0 . 
Position -2.935 0.749 15.360 1 .000** 
Opposition 0b . . 0 . 
a. The reference category is parliamentarism 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant 
The analysis shows that the effect of institutional type, city vs. county, disappears. 
The effect of party size also disappears. The two remaining explanatory factors 
are position vs. opposition and case-specific context. Regarding the case-specific 
context, support for parliamentary rule is significantly higher in Oslo, Bergen, and 
Nordland when compared to Hedmark. Hedmark is the case with the lowest sup-
port for the parliamentary model. The question is what kind of case-specific fac-
tors might account for the revealed differences? 
 
System support and contextual factors  
To explore how contextual factors affect system support, we made a comparative 
case study where we chose the extreme cases regarding support for the parliamen-
tary system. These are the cities of Oslo and Tromsø, and the counties of Nordland 
and Hedmark. We compare the cases regarding readiness for change, inclusive-
ness, and capacity for change. 
 
Oslo 
Oslo was a pioneer regarding parliamentary governance at the local level. Back in 
the 1980s the political leaders in Oslo struggled to bring about this arrangement. 
They considered parliamentary rule with a stronger executive board to be the best 
solution for improving the economic situation of the capital (Baldersheim 1992). 
Permission to introduce parliamentary rule was granted by the Norwegian parlia-
ment in 1986, with authorization in a special statute. The city’s history has led to 
a strong sense of ownership over the parliamentary model. The strong support for 
the parliamentary model has continued over time. Return to alderman rule has not 
been a big issue in Oslo, although there was some criticism from the opposition, 
particularly in the first years of parliamentary rule. Today, the criticism mostly 
focuses on a lack of transparency in political processes rather than on parliamen-
tary rule as a governance model.  
Earlier studies have characterized the parliamentary system in Oslo as a con-
sensual system (Hagen et al. 1999, Saxi 2006). However, it is an open question 
whether this consensus is a deliberate choice by the political leadership or whether 
it mainly reflects the political situation. After most elections since 1986, it was 
difficult to establish a majority executive. The Conservative Party, which held the 
position of executive board leader in most of the executives, needed support from 
the right-wing Progress Party or from two of the centrist parties. The centrist par-
ties refused to participate in the executive board together with the Progress Party. 
A rather special form of parliamentary rule has developed in which the city council 
has formally been in the minority but has ensured a majority with the help of 
agreements with parties in opposition.  
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The consensus characteristic has been strengthened by what may be viewed 
as a more deliberate leadership choice. The majority has been generous in distrib-
uting committee leadership positions to the parties in opposition. Working condi-
tions are also good, with salaries for full-time politicians also given to the opposi-
tion. Several minor adjustments to the model have also been implemented.  
Regarding change capacity, one particular factor deserves attention. Unlike 
the other cases, the city council in Oslo regularly includes members from the na-
tional parliament. Thus, Oslo has easier access to knowledge about parliamentary 
practice than the other cases. This may be part of the explanation for the successful 
implementation of parliamentary rule.   
 
Hedmark 
In 1987 Hedmark was first among the Norwegian counties to introduce a variety 
of parliamentary rule, however lacking the element of a no confidence vote. This 
was one of the experiments in the so-called “free commune” reform in Norway 
(Bukve and Hagen 1994). Parliamentary rule in Hedmark was introduced as a re-
sponse to a national call for innovative experiments in local and regional govern-
ment, and the preparation period was short. The experiment, however, did not re-
sult in the budget control that had been hoped for, and Hedmark returned to alder-
man rule after just four years. In spite of this, parliamentary rule was reintroduced 
in 2003 with the slenderest of majorities, with only 17 of 33 representatives voting 
in favor. The reform was not well anchored in the council, and readiness for 
change can be seen as low.  
A county executive board was established, but it also had a slender majority 
and only consisted of three members. This means that power was very concen-
trated in the “troika,” as some opposition politicians called it (Saxi and Stigen 2 
2006). The Labour Party has held a leadership position in the executive board 
since 2003. Voting in the county council is mainly block-dominated. A situation 
has developed where the opposition members claim that there is a democratic def-
icit in county politics. The whip principle is commonly used to keep the political 
majority together. Even though 20 of 35 council members voted for parliamentary 
rule in 2011, our survey shows a clear majority in favour of alderman rule among 
the respondents from the council. Altogether, the reform context in Hedmark is 
marked by a strong concentration of power and a lack of inclusiveness. 
There seems to be a lack of adaptive capacity and learning within the political 
leadership. Even if the parliamentary model failed in the first attempt due to a 
strong concentration of power and collective responsibility in the executive board, 
these features are still present in the way parliamentary rule is practiced in Hed-
mark today. 
 
Nordland 
In 1999, Nordland was the first county to establish parliamentary rule after it was 
permitted by the Local Government Act. Even in light of the earlier experiences 
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from Oslo and Hedmark, Nordland can be characterized as a case of an early re-
former. The preparatory work was solid, and a clear majority (35 of 53 council 
members) voted for establishing parliamentary rule (Saxi 2002). Readiness for 
change was quite high in Nordland, measured both by voting figures and by the 
preparatory work. 
The first county council executive board was established as a majority board, 
but it included as many as five political parties and was supported by 68% of the 
representatives in the county council. Such “oversized cabinets” can be described 
as consensus-based. Even if the executive board has continued to be a majority 
executive, many different parties have supported the board. The Labour Party has 
been the board’s leadership for the whole period, but in varying coalitions. Over 
time, nearly all the parties represented in the county council have been included 
in the executive board. Due to oversized coalitions and shifting alliances behind 
the executive, Nordland can be viewed as a case of inclusive reform implementa-
tion.  
Since many of the political parties have gained experience with executive 
work, they are able to evaluate the model and discuss the adjustment of the gov-
ernance model from different angles. This was probably helpful during the multi-
ple adjustments made to the model since 1999. At the council’s last vote on par-
liamentary rule, in 2011, the support figures were considerably higher than at the 
time of introduction; 43 of 53 members voted in favor, indicating a successful 
implementation (Saxi et al 2014).    
 
Tromsø 
Tromsø is the late reformer among our cases, introducing parliamentary rule in 
2011. The introduction of the parliamentary system was characterized by a rela-
tively good prior assessment and high support in the city council. Only 7 of the 43 
city council representatives voted against parliamentary rule, indicating a high de-
gree of readiness for change. 
But the story is different regarding inclusiveness. In recent evaluations, par-
liamentary rule in Tromsø is characterized as a case where “the winner takes all” 
(Saxi et al., 2014:44). Representatives of the opposition who voted for the parlia-
mentary system, view the concentration of power in the city executive board as 
not necessarily an effect of the parliamentary system as such, but rather as an ef-
fect of the city executive’s policy. The polarization of politics in Tromsø has 
deeper roots than the introduction of parliamentary rulein 2011, but it seems that 
parliamentary rule has strengthened this polarization. One informant mentioned 
that one now has a kind of “vulgarized parliamentarism, which is harmful for the 
public debate and also for democracy in the city.” Furthermore, the opposition 
politicians say that it is difficult to get information about political issues, and also 
hard to control the city executive board’s range of activities. Politics has been led 
out of the city council and committees and into the backrooms. As Table 4 shows, 
support for parliamentary rule is decreasing among the council members. 
Since parliamentary rule has a shorter history in Tromsø than in our other 
cases, change capacity is more difficult to assess. Interestingly enough, it has been 
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expressed in recent interviews that even executive board members want more con-
sensus-based political processes in Tromsø (Buck et al., 2015:26). The municipal 
election in September 2015 changed the political balance, and the former opposi-
tion could form a new executive. The junior parties in the coalition insisted on a 
changes in the political system, and the Labour party had to accept the demand in 
order to be able to form a majority executive. The reversing to the alderman model 
took place the 1st of July 2016. 
 
The cases compared 
As summarized in Table 5, the two cases with high system support are Oslo and 
Nordland. They are both characterized by high readiness for change, inclusive re-
form implementation, and sufficient capacity for change and adaptation during the 
reform period. The specific mechanisms for inclusion are different. In Oslo it is 
minority executives and power sharing with the opposition, while in Nordland it 
is oversized coalitions and shifting alliances. 
 
Table 5: Comparison of cases 
 Readiness 
for change 
Inclusive-
ness 
Change 
capacity 
System support 
Oslo High politi-
cal support 
 
Political 
ownership 
High 
 
Minority 
executives 
 
Position 
sharing 
Sufficient High 
Hed-
mark 
Slender ma-
jority 
 
Response to 
national call 
Low 
 
Power con-
centration 
Low Low 
Nord-
land 
High politi-
cal support 
 
Well pre-
pared 
High 
 
Oversized 
coalitions 
 
Shifting al-
liances 
Sufficient High 
Tromsø High politi-
cal support 
 
Low 
 
Open Low 
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Well pre-
pared 
Power con-
centration 
 
Tromsø is also characterized by high readiness for change, measured both by 
council voting and the solidity of the preparation process. But reform implemen-
tation in Tromsø has not been inclusive when compared to reform implementation 
in Oslo and Nordland. One result of this is decreasing support for the parliamen-
tary system, and finally a return to an alderman model. Hence, our findings point 
to inclusiveness in the implementation phase as important for the successful im-
plementation of a reform. Initial readiness for change is not enough. The initial 
drive for change has to be followed up during the implementation. 
From the case comparison, Hedmark seems to be lacking most of the contex-
tual conditions necessary for a successful reform process, as measured by broad 
system support. From the majority’s point of view, however, Hedmark may be 
considered as more of a success case. A kind of Labour-led coalition has remained 
in power during all the years of parliamentary rule. The core partners of this coa-
lition have increased their power through the reform. As long as they can get a 
majority in elections and the whip strategy works, it is in their interest to defend 
parliamentary rule. 
The case study supports the initial propositions about readiness for change, 
inclusiveness in the process, and change capacity as contextual factors that influ-
ence reform implementation. Yet it also supports the idea that these contextual 
factors must be linked to each other. Initial readiness for change can be seen as a 
kind of capital that supports reform decisions. But to avoid squandering it, this 
capital must be managed well during the reform process. Inclusiveness and adap-
tive capacity are vital for this kind of management. As we see from the case of 
Tromsø, reform capital that is not well managed tends to diminish quite quickly. 
From these cases we can only speculate whether a tiny reform capital, as was the 
case in Hedmark, could have been increased through a better managed reform 
process.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Our research started from three propositions about institutional effects, self-inter-
ested political actors, and contextual factors. Regarding the effects of institutional 
change, we found that the change to parliamentary rule affected position and op-
position members in different ways. Political power became more concentrated to 
the position and particularly to the executive, together with a corresponding loss 
of influence for the opposition. 
Our second proposition suggested that support for parliamentary rule would 
depend on how the reform affected self-interested political actors. This proposi-
tion found strong support in the data. Politicians belonging to the majority parties 
have a more positive view of parliamentary rule than the members of the opposi-
tion. Politicians with a greater chance of acquiring power, operationalized as pol-
iticians from the two biggest parties compared with members of the small parties, 
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are also more positive. Both these findings are in accordance with earlier research 
focusing on electoral institutions (Bowler et al. 2006). Our research indicates that 
the interests of the involved actors also play a role in the support of political insti-
tutions more generally.  
Our third proposition suggested that support for parliamentary rule also is af-
fected by contextual factors. Support increases when organisational readiness for 
change is high, when the reform is implemented in an inclusive way, and when 
the capacity for change and adaptation is sufficiently high. The variables are 
linked, since they relate to different stages of a reform cycle.    
We analysed contextual change drivers through a comparative case study. In 
both cases where the reform process had resulted in high support for the parlia-
mentary model, we find high readiness for change, inclusive implementation, and 
sufficient capacity for change and adaptation. However, the mechanisms for in-
clusion were not identical. An including leadership was present, but the mecha-
nisms for inclusion were partly produced by situational factors other than a delib-
erate effort by leadership. Our initial proposition is supported by the case study, 
but the study also shows that there may be different paths toward successful re-
form implementation.  
Both successful reformers were also early adopters. In the literature on re-
forms, it is commonly accepted that early adopters had an advantage in imple-
menting comprehensive reforms, since they were motivated reformers and were 
not merely copying others. However, our least successful case, with a turbulent 
reform history, was also an early adopter, and our last case combined a high initial 
level of readiness for change with a rapid loss of trust in the institutions reformed. 
It seems that no single variable can account for a successful process outcome. It 
is the interaction of the contextual variables that are decisive. Initial support is 
capital which may be lost in the course of the process. In general, our research 
supports a path dependent view of reform processes, with no uniform route to 
success (Streeck and Thelen 2005).   
The relationship between interests and inclusive implementation is also worth 
an afterthought. Including implementation can be perceived as a tool for compro-
mise between interests. However, it is more to the inclusiveness variable than a 
mere accommodation of self-interested actors. Some of the informants in the case 
studies argued against parliamentary rule not merely because it made them losers 
in the political process. Rather, they doubted the fairness of a political system that 
permitted the winners to take all without restrictions. In other words, they stressed 
procedural fairness rather than substantial fairness. This is in accordance with the 
findings of Tyler (1994) and Grimes (2006), who argued that procedural fairness 
is a factor behind the development of trust, and hence in system support. 
The general implication of our work is that we need to analyse institutional 
change as embedded change. Pure institutional effects are abstractions, and in real-
world change processes they are modified by a range of contextual factors. Process 
outcomes are shaped in a complex interplay between those factors. Ideas, interests, 
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capacity, and leadership all play a role in institutional change processes. The task 
is to understand the interplay and develop context-sensitive theory.  
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